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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
Allen Smith, Antoine Norman, Charles White, and 
Michael Merin were sentenced in 2008 for offenses related to 
their participation in a conspiracy to defraud banks.  On direct 
appeal, we affirmed their convictions, but vacated their 
sentences and remanded for the District Court to reconsider 
two sentencing issues.  Now, following resentencing, and in 
four separate appeals that have been consolidated for 
disposition, they challenge their new sentences and Smith 
challenges his new order of restitution.  We will vacate the 
order of restitution and, in all other respects, we will affirm 




A. Trial and the Initial Sentencing
1
   
 
Between February 2004 and November 2005, 
appellants participated in a scheme to defraud four banks—
Commerce Bank, Wachovia Bank, M&T Bank, and PNC 
Bank—out of hundreds of thousands of dollars.  Although 
appellants each had individual responsibilities in the scheme, 
they worked together to steal the personal identification 
information of account holders at the four banks.  Check-
runners, sometimes using false identification cards provided 
by appellants, would then pose as those account holders and 
withdraw money from their accounts, at times doing so by 
cashing counterfeit or closed-account checks. 
 
On July 26, 2006, appellants and six co-defendants 
were charged with various offenses in a 22-count indictment.  
Following trial, appellants were each convicted of one count 
of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity 
theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  They were also 
convicted of one or more substantive counts of bank fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and multiple counts of 
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. 
 
 The District Court sentenced appellants at separate 
hearings between September and December 2008, applying to 
all of them several offense-level enhancements pursuant to 
the Sentencing Guidelines.  One was a four-level 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2) for an offense 
involving at least fifty victims.  Various within-Guidelines 
sentences of imprisonment were thereafter imposed, as well 
as terms of supervised release, special assessments, and 
orders of restitution.  As relevant here, Smith was ordered to 
pay restitution of $68,452. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Facts regarding the underlying offense conduct are taken 
from United States v. Norman, 465 F. App’x 110 (3d Cir. 
2012), in which we resolved the issues appellants raised on 
direct appeal.   
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B. The Direct Appeal 
 On direct appeal, appellants alleged a number of trial 
and sentencing errors.  As we noted above, we affirmed their 
convictions, but vacated their sentences and remanded for 
reconsideration of certain sentencing issues.   
 
 The government conceded on direct appeal that 
resentencing was necessary in light of our decision in United 
States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2009), which issued 
subsequent to the sentencings in this case.  The District Court 
had found that appellants’ conduct injured 146 victims, 
including many account holders who were eventually 
reimbursed by the banks for their losses.  Kennedy held, 
however, that account holders who suffer only temporary 
losses are not victims for purposes of the victim enhancement 
under § 2B1.1(b)(2).  554 F.3d at 419.  We, thus, determined 
that it was appropriate to remand the case “for proceedings 
consistent with our opinion in Kennedy.”  Norman, 465 F. 
App’x at 121.  In doing so, we noted that, even under 
Kennedy, reimbursed account holders “may nevertheless 
qualify as victims if they ‘spent time or money seeking 
reimbursement.’”  Id. (quoting Kennedy, 554 F.3d at 422).  
We left it “to the District Court’s discretion as to whether to 
allow additional evidence” regarding the number of victims.  
Id.  We also determined that the District Court erred in 
calculating Smith’s criminal history category.  We vacated 
appellants’ sentences and remanded for reconsideration of 
these two issues.
2
   
 
C. Resentencing Proceedings 
 On November 2, 2012, before it held individual 
sentencing hearings, the District Court held a joint hearing to 
ascertain, as to all appellants, the number of victims for 
purposes of § 2B1.1(b)(2).   
 
 The government’s first witness was Marion Marcuggi, 
                                                 
2
  On resentencing, the District Court lowered Smith’s 
criminal history category from IV to III.  Smith does not 
challenge that before us, and we will not address it further.  
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a Commerce Bank customer.  Marcuggi testified that, in 
2004, Commerce Bank reported that a person using her name 
made a number of suspicious withdrawals from various bank 
locations.  The next day, Marcuggi drove to her local branch, 
reported that the transactions were fraudulent, and worked 
with bank representatives to close her existing accounts and 
open new ones.  Within a few days, Commerce Bank 
reimbursed the funds that had been taken from the account.  
Before then, Marcuggi made several trips to the police station 
to fill out reports and provide information for purposes of the 
criminal investigation that ensued.  She was not, however, 
reimbursed for any of her time or travel expenses. 
 
 Elaine Ford, a PNC Bank customer, was next to 
testify.  After noticing a discrepancy between her bank 
statement and check register in April 2005 and receiving 
several late-payment notices during the following month, 
Ford stated that she drove to her bank to report that money 
was missing from her account.  There, she met with the 
branch manager, who flagged her account and, together, they 
contacted the police.  One week later, Ford closed her account 
and opened a new one.  She returned to the bank on another 
occasion to confirm that she was not the individual captured 
in surveillance footage conducting a transaction on her 
account and that the signature the unidentified person 
provided was not Ford’s own.  Her two trips to the bank took 
several hours.  She also spent approximately three hours on 
the phone with the bank to resolve the unauthorized activity.  
PNC Bank replaced the stolen funds one month after Ford 
first reported the suspicious transactions.  The bank did not 
reimburse her for her time or the cost of transportation to and 
from the bank. 
 
 Postal Inspector Thomas Ninan, the agent assigned to 
the case, was the government’s final witness.  He testified 
that, during the week leading up to the hearing, he 
interviewed Sandra Posey, Arelis Diaz, Kim Cogswell, 
Angela Peffley, Michelle Rosmarin, and Joanne Ponzio, all of 
whom discovered fraudulent activity in their accounts that 
was traced to appellants’ bank fraud operation, and all of 
whom were eventually reimbursed by their respective banks 
for the funds fraudulently taken.  With the exception of 
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Ponzio, each of those account holders also prepared a written 
statement.
3
  Ninan identified the written statements, and they 
were admitted into evidence. 
 
 According to those statements, Posey, Diaz, Peffley, 
and Rosmarin discovered that money had been removed from 
their accounts without their authorization and Cogswell 
learned from Commerce Bank’s fraud department that her 
account had been closed when fraudulent activity was 
detected.
4
  Each of the account holders traveled to her bank at 
least once to report that she had not consented to the 
transactions and to resolve issues related to the fraud.  Two of 
them, Posey and Diaz, were required to go to their banks 
more than once.  Posey went twice, initially to submit a 
reimbursement form and four or five weeks later because the 
money had not yet been restored to her account.  Diaz visited 
her bank, located five miles from her home, once or twice a 
week for a period of two or three weeks, and called the bank 
every other day inquiring about the status of its fraud 
investigation and her promised reimbursement.   
 
 Some of the account holders stated that they needed to 
take time off from work to tend to these matters.  Cogswell 
used a vacation day to meet with bank personnel, and Peffley 
took two unpaid days to try to find out why money was 
missing and her account overdrawn.  Peffley and her husband 
took another day without pay to attend court proceedings 
relating to this case.  For her part, Diaz cut short a planned 
vacation to address the unaccounted-for withdrawal on her 
account and, without adequate funds at her disposal, had to 
use money intended for her vacation to pay bills that came 
due.   
                                                 
3
 Diaz, Cogswell, Peffley, and Rosmarin provided their 
written statements directly to Ninan.  Posey gave her 
statement to another inspector, but Ninan confirmed that the 
written statement matched in substance what Posey said 
during his interview of her. 
4
 Cogswell did not specifically claim in her statement that 
money was taken from her account, although Ninan’s 
testimony suggests that she was at some point reimbursed for 
stolen funds.   
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 With respect to Ponzio, Ninan testified that she had 
planned to appear as a witness but was unable to attend the 
hearing due to complications from Hurricane Sandy and was 
unable to provide a written statement.  Ninan, therefore, 
testified as to what she told him during the course of their 
multiple conversations.  In addition, he had prepared a 
memorandum memorializing those conversations, a 
memorandum the government provided to appellants on the 
morning of the hearing.  According to Ninan’s testimony, 
Ponzio informed him that, in 2004, she discovered that money 
was missing from her Commerce Bank account, leaving her 
with a negative balance and causing some of her checks to 
bounce.  She took a vacation day from work and drove to the 
bank to resolve the problem and seek reimbursement and to 
the police station to report the theft.  At some point after her 
visit, Commerce Bank reimbursed Ponzio for the money 
taken from her account, but did not reimburse her for her time 
or travel expenses.  Ninan testified that Posey, Diaz, 
Cogswell, Peffley, and Rosmarin similarly made at least one 
trip to their banks before being reimbursed. 
 
 Following the joint hearing, the parties submitted 
supplemental memoranda addressing the application of the 
victim enhancement.  Appellants objected to the introduction 
of additional evidence, arguing that the government could 
have presented this evidence at the initial sentencing hearings 
but failed to do so.  They further asserted that the introduction 
of witness testimony through Inspector Ninan violated their 
constitutional rights both under the Confrontation Clause, 
because they had no opportunity to cross-examine the account 
holders themselves, and the Due Process Clause, because the 
witness statements were unreliable and because appellants did 
not receive those statements from the government until a day 
or two before the hearing.  The District Court rejected their 
arguments and concluded that the offenses involved twelve 
victims: the four banks that reimbursed their account holders’ 
losses and the eight account holders who provided statements 
in court or through Ninan.  That finding triggered a two-level 
enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) for a theft or fraud 
offense involving ten or more victims. 
 
 The District Court subsequently resentenced appellants 
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at individual hearings.  The Court reduced the term of 
imprisonment as to each one, imposed the same special 
assessment, and maintained or lowered the term of supervised 
release.  It also confirmed the existing orders of restitution 
against White, Norman, and Merin, but increased Smith’s 
order of restitution by $9,000, from $68,452 to $77,452.  
Appellants timely filed separate appeals that have been 
consolidated for purposes of disposition.   
 
II.  ANALYSIS5 
 On appeal, appellants, in varying configurations, press 
many of the same arguments presented to the District Court.  
We address each in turn. 
 
A. Reopening the Record 
 Smith and White renew their contention that the 
District Court acted improperly by reopening the record and 
permitting the government to introduce at the joint hearing 
additional evidence regarding the number of victims.  The 
District Court’s decision to reopen the record is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 
180 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
 When determining whether to reopen a proceeding, the 
paramount factor for a district court to consider is whether 
reopening, if permitted, would prejudice the party opposing it.  
United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Timing is key to this analysis.  “If [reopening] comes at a 
stage in the proceedings where the opposing party will have 
an opportunity to respond and attempt to rebut the evidence 
introduced,” the possibility of prejudice is greatly lessened.  
Coward, 296 F.3d at 181 (quoting United States v. 
Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 1985)).  In addition, 
a party that seeks to reopen a proceeding must provide a 
reasonable explanation for its failure to initially present the 
evidence.  Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 220.  In this regard, 
                                                 
5
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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“[c]onsideration should be given to whether the law on point 
at the time was unclear or ambiguous.”  Coward, 296 F.3d at 
182. 
 
 Appellants were not prejudiced by reopening the 
record.  They received notice of the evidence to be offered by 
the government prior to the November 2012 hearing and were 
afforded an opportunity to respond to and rebut that evidence 
through cross-examination of the witnesses who testified and 
by the submission of post-hearing memoranda.  Appellants 
also had the opportunity to offer evidence of their own at the 
hearing, and declined to do so.   
 
 Moreover, the government provided a reasonable 
explanation for why it had not previously offered evidence 
specifically addressing the unreimbursed costs incurred by 
the account holders who were victimized by appellants.  At 
the time of the initial sentencings, we had not yet decided 
whether an individual who recovers his or her losses is a 
victim under § 2B1.1(b)(2), and the District Court accepted 
the government’s theory that temporary losses were sufficient 
to confer victim status.  Certainly, the “prevailing rule of our 
sister circuits” was that, to be a victim, an individual must 
suffer a permanent monetary loss.  Norman, 465 F. App’x at 
121 (citing United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 489 (5th 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 969-70 (8th 
Cir. 2007); United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971-72 (6th 
Cir. 2005)).  The decisions of the courts of appeals were not 
unanimous, however.  In United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 
895 (11th Cir. 2005), the Eleventh Circuit suggested that even 
a temporary loss rendered one a victim under the Guidelines.  
Critically, we had not yet addressed the question, first doing 
so and rejecting the government’s approach in United States 
v. Kennedy, after appellants were sentenced.  Thus, the 
District Court was warranted in determining that the law on 
point was “unclear or ambiguous” at the time of initial 
sentencing.
6
  Coward, 296 F.3d at 182.  In view of our 
                                                 
6
 Disagreement over § 2B1.1(b)(2)’s definition of “victim” 
has, in fact, persisted.  Shortly after we decided Kennedy, the 
First Circuit squarely rejected our interpretation, concluding 
that, regardless of whether account holders are reimbursed, 
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acknowledgement that we would “leave it to the District 
Court’s discretion as to whether to allow additional 
evidence,” Norman, 465 F. App’x at 121, the District Court 
did not overstep the bounds of that discretion when it decided 
to do just that.   
 
B. Adequacy of Evidence and Notice 
 Appellants also contend that the government’s 
introduction of evidence at the joint hearing violated their 
constitutional rights and did not comply with the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  They maintain that the hearing in 
question was not a sentencing hearing, but was instead an 
evidentiary hearing at which their Sixth Amendment rights 
applied.  Consequently, according to appellants, the 
introduction of witness testimony through the witnesses’ 
written statements and Ninan’s testimony deprived them of 
their right under the Confrontation Clause to confront adverse 
witnesses and constituted impermissible hearsay.  In addition, 
they argue that the unreliability of the hearsay statements and 
the government’s failure to provide them with adequate 
notice of the evidence it intended to present abridged their 
right to due process.  We review de novo whether the 
Constitution and Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate the 
rights envisioned by appellants.  United States v. One Toshiba 
Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 
banc); United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 
 As a preliminary matter, appellants are simply wrong 
when they argue that the November 2012 joint hearing was 
something other than part of, and integral to, the resentencing 
process, even though each appellant may have been sentenced 
individually at a subsequent proceeding.  The joint hearing 
was held to resolve the applicability of a particular Guideline 
enhancement pertinent to all appellants.  The fact that the 
District Court heard evidence on this subject, a practice 
                                                                                                             
they sustain an “actual loss” in economic terms and qualify as 
“victims” if money is taken out of their accounts without 
authorization.  United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 55-58 
& n.6 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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contemplated by both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32(i) and § 6A1.3 of the Guidelines, does not alter the nature 
of the hearing.  Indeed, on direct appeal we made clear that 
the only substantive matter on remand was sentencing, and 
that the District Court could, if it chose, allow additional 
evidence.  See Norman, 465 F. App’x at 126-27. 
 
 That being so, appellants were not entitled, as a 
constitutional matter, to confront the account holders whose 
statements were introduced as evidence at the joint hearing.  
Indeed, we have held that, according to “well settled” 
precedent, “the Confrontation Clause does not apply in the 
sentencing context and does not prevent the introduction of 
hearsay testimony at a sentencing hearing.”  United States v. 
Robinson, 482 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2007); accord United 
States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 392-93 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that the courts of appeals have uniformly held and 
recent Supreme Court cases further suggest that 
Confrontation Clause rights apply only “during the 
determination of [defendants’] guilt or innocence” and not 
during the sentencing phase). 
 
 This conclusion also disposes of appellants’ hearsay 
objection.  In sentencing proceedings, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not apply and a district court may rely on 
hearsay.  Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); United States v. Miele, 
989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
 That does not mean, of course, that a sentencing 
court’s consideration of hearsay is unbounded.  Pursuant to 
the Due Process Clause, hearsay statements may be used at 
sentencing only if they bear “some minimal indicium of 
reliability beyond mere allegation.”  Robinson, 482 F.3d at 
246 (internal quotation omitted).  The evidence offered 
through Inspector Ninan surely satisfied that standard.  The 
statements of the account-holder victims, just like the victim-
impact statements routinely considered at sentencing 
hearings, involved matters within the knowledge of each 
declarant and were made in the course of interviews by one or 
more law enforcement officials.  Ninan confirmed that he had 
interviewed each victim and that each statement submitted to 
the District Court was either drafted during the course of his 
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interview or, in the case of Posey, consistent with information 
she had provided to him and to another inspector.  Ninan’s 
testimony as to what Ponzio told him during their 
conversations is also sufficiently reliable.  We have long 
accepted an agent’s recitation of information obtained from a 
third party who appears credible, and the District Court was 
presented with no reason to doubt Ponzio’s credibility.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1548 (3d Cir. 
1993) (finding at least minimally reliable an agent’s 
recounting of a conversation with “a reliable confidential 
informant”). 
 
 We are not unmindful of appellants’ argument that 
Ninan did not interview the account holders until days before 
the hearing, the topics discussed in each statement were quite 
similar, none of the interviews was taped, and—with the 
exception of the Ponzio interview—Ninan did not take notes.  
Nevertheless, these arguments are not sufficient to render the 
account holders’ statements unreliable, particularly given that 
the record was devoid of anything to contradict their 
recounting of events.  Indeed, appellants offered nothing 
aside from bare speculation to suggest that Ninan exercised 
undue influence over what the account holders reported in 
their statements.  As the District Court noted, it was 
reasonable for Ninan to ask each one similar questions given 
the narrow sentencing issue before the Court, i.e., whether she 
suffered unreimbursed losses due to the fraud on her account.  
And there was nothing in Ninan’s testimony to suggest that 
the questions posed were in any way leading or improper.  
Moreover, the District Court, before which, of course, Ninan 
testified, deemed his testimony to be credible.  That 
assessment is entitled to substantial deference.  United States 
v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 464 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 
 Finally, appellants offer no authority—either binding 
or even persuasive—for the proposition that due process 
obligates the government to supply a criminal defendant with 
advance notice of evidence it intends to present at a 
sentencing hearing.  Certainly, neither the Supreme Court nor 




  United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d 467, 473 
(3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Jackson, 649 F.2d 967, 978-
79 (3d Cir. 1981) (observing the lack of any precedent 
holding that due process requires the government to give 
notice of the evidence it will offer at sentencing).  Appellants’ 
due process challenge is, therefore, unavailing. 
 
C. Judicial Factfinding 
 White and Norman argue, as they did on direct appeal, 
that the District Court violated their Sixth Amendment rights 
by enhancing their Guidelines range on the basis of judge-
found facts.  They contend that a jury, not a sentencing judge, 
must find any facts that increase a defendant’s sentence, even 
if, as in this case, the sentence implicated neither a mandatory 
minimum nor a statutory maximum.  Our review over this 
issue of law is plenary.  United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 
438, 452 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
 Whatever support White and Norman’s position may 
find from non-authoritative sources, it is foreclosed by our 
precedent.  We have stated, sitting en banc, that the 
constitutional rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt attach only to facts that “constitut[e] the 
elements of a crime,” which are those facts that increase the 
maximum statutory punishment to which the defendant is 
exposed.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc) (relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000)).  Facts relevant to the application of various 
Guidelines provisions, which are advisory only, do not 
implicate these rights.  Id. at 567-68.  A district court may, 
                                                 
7
 We have, on the other hand, interpreted Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32 to require pre-hearing disclosure of 
documents on which a district court will rely at sentencing.  
United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 764 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Appellants have not lodged an objection under Rule 32, 
however, and, even if they had, there was no violation of that 
Rule.  Given the limited number and uncomplicated nature of 
the statements here, notice of that evidence one or two days 
prior to the hearing was sufficient to satisfy the Rule’s 
disclosure requirement.  See id. at 765. 
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consistent with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, engage in 
additional factfinding, using a preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard, to select an appropriate sentence up to the statutory 
maximum based on application of the Guidelines.  Id. at 562-
68.  Indeed, we held as much when this very issue was raised 
on direct appeal.  Norman, 465 F. App’x at 120-21. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), has not changed the 
field of play.  Alleyne simply held that, as with facts 
necessary for the imposition of a statutory maximum 
sentence, facts that trigger a statutory mandatory minimum 
sentence must, under the Sixth Amendment, also be 
submitted to a jury.  Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160.  Alleyne did 
not curtail a sentencing court’s ability to find facts relevant in 
selecting a sentence within the prescribed statutory range.  Id. 
at 2163.  Thus, the District Court did not commit legal error 
in so doing.   
 
D. 10-Victim Enhancement 
 The central issue on appeal is whether the District 
Court correctly determined the number of appellants’ victims, 
as defined in § 2B1.1(b)(2).  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines and 
review its factual findings for clear error.  Grier, 475 F.3d at 
570. 
 
 Under the Guidelines, a defendant convicted of a theft 
or fraud offense is subject to a two-offense-level 
enhancement if the offense “involved 10 or more victims.”  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A).  The Commentary to the 2005 
version of the Guidelines, which all parties agree is the 
version applicable to sentencing in this case, defined “victim” 
as “any person who sustained . . . actual loss.”  Id. § 2B1.1 
cmt. n.1.
8
  “Actual loss,” in turn, is defined as “the reasonably 
                                                 
8
 Guidelines Commentary “that interprets or explains a 
guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or 
a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous 
reading of, that guideline.”  Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 
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foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.”  
Id. cmt. n.3(A)(i).  The Application Notes explain that 
“‘[p]ecuniary harm’ means harm that is monetary or that 
otherwise is readily measurable in money,” and, therefore, 
does not include non-economic harm.  Id. cmt. n.3(A)(iii).  
Certain forms of economic damages are also excluded from 
the Guidelines’ definition of “actual loss.”  These include 
“costs incurred by victims primarily to aid the government 
in[] the prosecution and criminal investigation of an offense.”  
Id. cmt. n.3(D). 
 
 As we mentioned at the outset of this Opinion, we 
interpreted § 2B1.1(b)(2)’s victim enhancement provision in 
United States v. Kennedy.  The defendant in Kennedy used 
her position as a manager of senior citizen benefits accounts 
to steal money from 34 individual account holders.  After 
reviewing the statutory language in light of the Commentary 
which, we note, is still applicable in this case, we held that 
only those parties who suffer permanent “pecuniary harm” 
constitute “victims” under § 2B1.1(b)(2).  Kennedy, 554 F.3d 
at 419.  We, therefore, found that the district court in Kennedy 
erred by including as victims individual account holders who 
were later reimbursed the money that the defendant had 
removed from their accounts.  The government, we stated, 
“failed to meet its burden to prove that the account holders 
even knew that their funds had been stolen before they were 
completely reimbursed.”9  Id.   
                                                                                                             
36, 38 (1993); see also United States v. Keller, 666 F.3d 103, 
108 (3d Cir. 2011). 
9
 The government correctly points out that, later in 2009, the 
Commentary to § 2B1.1 was amended and expanded the 
definition of “victim” to include not only persons who 
suffered actual loss but also those “whose means of 
identification [were] used unlawfully or without authority.”  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E)(ii).  In making this change, the 
Sentencing Commission cited our decision in Kennedy.  The 
Commission explained that any individual whose identity is 
stolen should be considered a victim for purposes of the 
enhancement, “even if fully reimbursed,” because a target of 
identity theft “must often spend significant time resolving 
credit problems and related issues, and such lost time may not 
 17 
 Our opinion in Kennedy went on to explain that our 
interpretation was consistent with the law of other circuits, 
and we surveyed opinions of several of our sister courts of 
appeals.  Chief among them was the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
in United States v. Yagar.  Yagar held that an account holder 
who is fully reimbursed for stolen funds cannot be considered 
a victim under the Guidelines.  Id. at 419-20 (reviewing 
Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971).  Yagar suggested, however, that 
account holders who recoup those monies might still be 
victims if, as a practical matter, they suffered some additional 
pecuniary harm.  Id. at 420.  Drawing on this “Yagar carve-
out,” the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits found that 
individuals who expend time, effort, and money before 
successfully obtaining reimbursement suffer an actual loss 
and remain victims under § 2B1.1(b)(2).
 10
  Id. at 421-22 
                                                                                                             
be adequately accounted for in the loss calculations under the 
guidelines.”  Id. app. C (2011) (discussing amendment 726).  
No party contends that this change has any bearing on this 
case. 
10
 For his part, Norman contends that the account holders 
cannot be victims because their monetary losses were not 
specifically calculated and counted as part of the District 
Court’s loss calculation.  The Second, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits have all found that a party may be considered a 
victim only if the party’s loss was included in the court’s 
overall loss estimate.  Armstead, 552 F.3d at 780-81; 
Abiodun, 536 F.3d at 169; United States v. Leach, 417 F.3d 
1099, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 2005).  Norman did not raise this 
argument in the District Court, however, and we, therefore, 
review for plain error.  United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 
203 (3d Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  To prevail on 
appeal under plain error review, a defendant “must establish 
an error that is plain, which affect his substantial rights, and 
which, if not rectified, would seriously affected the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United 
States v. Ward, 626 F.3d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, 
Norman fails to satisfy that standard because he has not 
established an error that was plain.  We note that, unlike the 
Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, we have not spoken as to 
how district courts must account for the number of victims in 
the loss calculation, and we decline to do so here.   
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(discussing United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 
2008); United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Pham, 545 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Lee, 427 F.3d at 895).  We agreed with the general approach 
of those courts, and stated that “had the Government shown 
that the account holders that Kennedy defrauded spent time or 
money seeking reimbursement, this would be a closer case.”  
Id. at 422.  No such evidence had been presented, however.  
Our apparent approval of the carve-out recognized in “the 
Yagar line of cases” was, therefore, obiter dictum.  Id. 
 
 This case presents the opportunity to adopt Kennedy’s 
dicta as a holding of our Court: a party that is reimbursed for 
stolen funds but, as a practical matter, suffers additional 
pecuniary harm may qualify as a victim suffering “actual 
loss” under § 2B1.1(b)(2).11  We see no need to define the full 
scope of pecuniary harm capable of conferring victim status.  
For purposes of this case, it is sufficient to hold that one 
example of cognizable pecuniary harm is the expenditure of 
time and money to regain misappropriated funds and replace 
compromised bank accounts.  This interpretation of “actual 
loss” and “victim” comports with both the Guidelines and the 
conclusions of coordinate appellate courts, not to mention the 
commonsense proposition that an account holder who must 
spend time and resources to dispute fraudulent activity, 
recoup stolen funds, and repair his or her credit and financial 
security has suffered a monetizable loss that is a reasonably 
foreseeable and direct consequence of the defendant’s theft or 
fraud.  See, e.g., Pham, 545 F.3d at 721; Abiodun, 536 F.3d at 
168-69. 
 
 Here, the District Court did not clearly err in 
determining that appellants’ offenses involved twelve victims, 
                                                 
11
 Again, the 2009 amendments to the Guidelines 
Commentary, which do not apply in this case, appear to make 
it easier for targets of identity theft to qualify as victims.  
Thus, what we say here regarding the requirements for victim 
status may not necessarily extend to the subjects of identity 
theft under the revised Guidelines Commentary.  See Keller, 
666 F.3d at 108 (finding that we are bound by amendments to 
Guidelines Commentary). 
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a number sufficient to trigger the ten-or-more-victims 
enhancement.  The parties, save one, agree that the four banks 
from which funds were taken constitute victims of appellants’ 
bank fraud conspiracy.
12
  The government also presented 
evidence that the eight individual account holders suffered 
actual, pecuniary losses as a result of appellants’ conduct.  
Appellants are correct that the time and money spent by these 
account holders to assist in the investigation by law 
enforcement and the eventual prosecution—their trips, e.g., to 
the police station and to court—cannot be deemed actual loss.  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(ii).  Even so, the account 
holders suffered monetizable harm in their efforts to regain 
the funds taken from their accounts, efforts that necessarily 
included reporting the fraud to their respective banks and 
disputing the unauthorized activity in the first instance. 
 
 After noticing suspicious activity and prior to being 
reimbursed by her bank, each of the eight account holders 
traveled to a branch office at least once to deal with the fraud.  
Some of them were required to make multiple trips or phone 
calls to have their funds restored and establish new accounts, 
spending hours of their time to do so.  These account holders 
were not reimbursed for the expenses involved with their trips 
or the time spent in communication with the banks.  
Additionally, Ponzio, Cogswell, and Peffley had to take time 
off from work and use vacation days to attend meetings at 
their banks, Diaz was forced to cut short her vacation to 
resolve her financial troubles, and Rosmarin paid a credit 
service to investigate her credit rating in the wake of the 
unauthorized account activity she had suffered.  These are the 
very sorts of actual losses recognized by courts following 
Yagar, and are sufficient to confirm the eight account 
holders’ status as victims under the Guidelines.  See Pham, 
545 F.3d at 721 (finding forfeited vacation days and the cost 
                                                 
12
 Only Smith disagrees.  He challenges the inclusion of M&T 
Bank as a victim of his conduct, as he was acquitted of the 
bank fraud charge with respect to it.  His claim is of dubious 
merit, given that he was convicted of conspiracy to commit 
bank fraud and the conspiracy’s activity targeted that bank.  
But even if we do not consider M&T Bank’s victim status as 
to Smith, there remain ten or more victims of his conduct. 
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of gas for trips to and from banks, telephone calls, stamps, 
and replacement checks related to resolution of disputed 
account activity and initiation of fraud investigations with 
credit reporting services could constitute “actual loss” under 
the Guidelines); Abiodun, 536 F.3d at 168-69 (finding the 
value of “lost time” spent securing reimbursement could 
constitute “actual loss”); cf. Conner, 537 F.3d at 491 (noting 
the possibility that the value of “business time” spent paying 
fraudulent charges could be considered an “actual loss”). 
 
 Appellants counter that it is only the expenditure of 
substantial or appreciable amounts of time and money that 
constitutes actual loss—far more, they suggest, than that 
spent by the account holders here.  It is certainly true that 
Yagar found that the account holders in that case could not 
qualify as victims because the money taken from their 
accounts was “immediately covered by a third-party” and 
their losses were “short-lived.”  Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.  
Other courts, relying on this language, have intimated that the 
speed of reimbursement or the magnitude of costs realized 
bears on whether an account holder has suffered an actual 
loss.  See, e.g., Pham, 545 F.3d at 719-20; Lee, 427 F.3d at 
895.  But the controlling question for the Yagar court was 
whether the account holders “suffered [an] adverse effect as a 
practical matter from [the defendant’s] conduct,” not the 
number of days or amount of money it took to regain their 
stolen funds.
13
  Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.  In Yagar’s factual 
recitation, there is simply no indication that the account 
holders had to expend any time or resources to secure 
reimbursement. 
 
 In view of Yagar’s rationale, which we adopt, we see 
no principled reason to treat only appreciable or substantial 
                                                 
13
 Indeed, the Yagar court went so far as to analyze whether 
there was sufficient evidence to find that six account holders 
suffered pecuniary harm when they had to order new checks.  
Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971-72.  Although the court found that the 
record failed to establish who ultimately paid for the new 
checks, the account holders or their banks, it did not find that 
reordering checks, which assuredly requires minimal time and 
money, was too small a cost to constitute an “actual loss.” 
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expenditures of time and money as “actual losses” under the 
Guidelines.  The size of the loss has no bearing on its ability 
to be monetized, its foreseeability to the defendant, or its 
nexus to the offense conduct.  Nor would the lack of an 
“appreciable” loss requirement transform every customer 
whose account is invaded into a Guidelines victim, rendering 
superfluous the “actual loss” element.  As the facts of 
Kennedy demonstrate, some account holders may be 
reimbursed before they even realize that money has been 
taken from their accounts.  See Kennedy, 554 F.3d at 419.  In 
sum, the account holders in this case suffered unreimbursed, 
albeit small, losses in attempting to redress the fraudulent 
activity perpetrated by appellants.  We hold that they are 
victims under the Guidelines.  
 
 Smith makes one last argument against application of 
the victim enhancement, an argument that need not long 
detain us.  He argues that a separate Guideline provision, § 
2B1.6, renders the § 2B1.1(b)(2) victim enhancement 
inapplicable.  The Application Notes to § 2B1.6 state that, if a 
sentence for aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 
1028A is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for a 
separate, underlying offense, as it was in this case, the district 
court should not apply an enhancement “for the transfer, 
possession, or use of a means of identification when 
determining the sentence for the underlying offense.”  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2.  Quite plainly, the victim 
enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(2) is not an enhancement 
based on the use of a “means of identification”; it is an 
enhancement based on the number of victims.  Section 2B1.6 
does not preclude application of the victim enhancement with 
respect to appellants’ bank fraud offenses. 
 
E. The Order of Restitution as to Smith 
 In its initial judgment of sentence, the District Court 
ordered Smith to pay restitution in the amount of $68,452.  
This amount reflected losses incurred by Commerce Bank 
and Wachovia Bank.  Although Smith’s pre-sentence report 
identified a $9,000 loss to M&T Bank, as well, the Probation 
Department took no position as to whether Smith should be 
held responsible for that amount or for any loss to PNC Bank.  
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(Smith PSR ¶¶ 68, 170.)  Those losses were certainly 
attributable to the activities of the conspiracy, but Smith had 
been acquitted of the substantive fraud counts relating to 
those institutions.  At sentencing, the District Court did not 
hold Smith responsible for the losses to M&T Bank or PNC 
Bank, and neither Smith nor the government appealed that 
ruling. 
 
 During Smith’s resentencing, however, the District 
Court, at the parties’ urging, revisited the matter of his 
restitution.  The government argued that Smith should be held 
jointly and severally liable for repaying the $9,000 loss 
incurred by M&T Bank because it was a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of and attributable to the conspiracy 
of which he was a member.  Smith maintained that his order 
of restitution should be reduced to $0.  He argued that his 
acquittal on the substantive count relating to M&T Bank 
precluded any responsibility as to him for the loss realized by 
that institution, and that he should not be ordered to pay 
restitution to the other banks because they failed to submit 
loss reports to the Probation Department.  The District Court 
agreed with the government, and increased the amount of 
Smith’s restitution by $9,000 to $77,452.   
 
 On this appeal, Smith again contends that his 
restitutionary obligation should be extinguished; however, the 
government has altered its position.  It now contends that the 
initial order of restitution in the amount of $68,452 should be 
reinstated, and concedes that the District Court exceeded the 
scope of our remand by reconsidering that issue.  We exercise 
plenary review as to whether the District Court properly 
interpreted and applied our mandate.  Kilbarr Corp. v. Bus. 
Sys. Inc., B.V., 990 F.2d 83, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
 The government is correct.  The District Court 
exceeded the scope of our mandate when it revisited its initial 
order of restitution against Smith, although in so doing it was 
clearly doing what counsel had asked it to do.  Our mandate 
identified only two sentence-related issues for the District 
Court to reconsider on remand: (1) the determination of the 
number of victims for purposes of a particular Guideline 
enhancement and (2) the calculation of Smith’s criminal 
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history category.  Norman, 465 F. App’x at 126-27; 
Judgment, United States v. Norman, 465 F. App’x 110 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (No. 08-3969).  At no point did we authorize the 
parties to reargue or the District Court to revisit its ruling on 
the amount of restitution ordered against Smith. 
 
 That aside, the parties waived any argument that the 
amount of restitution as to Smith should be different.  A party 
may not litigate on remand or subsequent appeal issues that 
“were not raised in [the] party’s prior appeal and that were 
not explicitly or implicitly remanded for further proceedings.”  
Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 203 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  We will, therefore, vacate the revised restitution 
order as to Smith and remand for the District Court to 
reinstate its initial order in the amount of $68,452. 
 
F. Merin’s Remaining Argument 
 Merin raises one additional argument.  He contends 
that the evidence at trial failed to establish an agreement on 
his part to undertake or aid all of the conspiracy’s bank fraud 
activity, and so the District Court erred in attributing to him 
the full loss caused by the conspiracy.  Merin raised, and we 
rejected, this same loss-calculation argument on direct appeal.  
Norman, 465 F. App’x at 123-25.  That decision is law of the 
case, and Merin has not shown the “extraordinary 
circumstances” we generally require before we will revisit a 
prior decision in the same action.
14
  Feesers, Inc. v. Michael 
Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 191, 207 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
judgments of sentence, but will vacate the order of restitution 
imposed against Smith and remand with instructions to 
reinstate the initial order of restitution of $68,452. 
 
                                                 
14
 To the extent that Merin also challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence underlying his conspiracy conviction, he failed 
to raise this argument on direct appeal and it is, accordingly, 
waived.  See Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 203. 
